Files
web2py/gluon/contrib/web2py_jwt.py
T
2015-12-04 10:30:56 -06:00

305 lines
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Python

# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
import datetime
import uuid
import time
from gluon.serializers import json_parser
import base64
import hmac
import hashlib
from gluon.storage import Storage
from gluon.utils import web2py_uuid
from gluon import current
from gluon.http import HTTP
class Web2pyJwt(object):
"""
If left externally, this needs the usual "singleton" approach.
Given I (we) don't know if to include in auth yet, let's stick to basics.
Args:
- secret_key: the secret. Without salting, an attacker knowing this can impersonate
any user
- algorithm : uses as they are in the JWT specs, HS256, HS384 or HS512 basically means
signing with HMAC with a 256, 284 or 512bit hash
- verify_expiration : verifies the expiration checking the exp claim
- leeway: allow n seconds of skew when checking for token expiration
- expiration : how many seconds a token may be valid
- allow_refresh: enable the machinery to get a refreshed token passing a not-already-expired
token
- refresh_expiration_delta: to avoid continous refresh of the token
- header_prefix : self-explanatory. "JWT" and "Bearer" seems to be the emerging standards
- jwt_add_header: a dict holding additional mappings to the header. by default only alg and typ are filled
- user_param: the name of the parameter holding the username when requesting a token. Can be useful, e.g, for
email-based authentication, with "email" as a parameter
- pass_param: same as above, but for the password
- realm: self-explanatory
- salt: can be static or a function that takes the payload as an argument.
Example:
def mysalt(payload):
return payload['hmac_key'].split('-')[0]
- additional_payload: can be a dict to merge with the payload or a function that takes
the payload as input and returns the modified payload
Example:
def myadditional_payload(payload):
payload['my_name_is'] = 'bond,james bond'
return payload
- before_authorization: can be a callable that takes the deserialized token (a dict) as input.
Gets called right after signature verification but before the actual
authorization takes place. You can raise with HTTP a proper error message
Example:
def mybefore_authorization(tokend):
if not tokend['my_name_is'] == 'bond,james bond':
raise HTTP(400, u'Invalid JWT my_name_is claim')
- max_header_length: check max length to avoid load()ing unusually large tokens (could mean crafted, e.g. in a DDoS.)
Basic Usage:
in models (or the controller needing it)
myjwt = Web2pyJwt('secret', auth)
in the controller issuing tokens
def login_and_take_token():
return myjwt.jwt_token_manager()
A call then to /app/controller/login_and_take_token/auth with username and password returns the token
A call to /app/controller/login_and_take_token/refresh with the original token returns the refreshed token
To protect a function with JWT
@myjwt.requires_jwt()
@auth.requires_login()
def protected():
return '%s$%s' % (request.now, auth.user_id)
"""
def __init__(self, secret_key,
auth,
algorithm='HS256',
verify_expiration=True,
leeway=30,
expiration=60 * 5,
allow_refresh=True,
refresh_expiration_delta=60 * 60,
header_prefix='Bearer',
jwt_add_header=None,
user_param='username',
pass_param='password',
realm='Login required',
salt=None,
additional_payload=None,
before_authorization=None,
max_header_length=4*1024,
):
self.secret_key = secret_key
self.auth = auth
self.algorithm = algorithm
if self.algorithm not in ('HS256', 'HS384', 'HS512'):
raise NotImplementedError('Algoritm %s not allowed' % algorithm)
self.verify_expiration = verify_expiration
self.leeway = leeway
self.expiration = expiration
self.allow_refresh = allow_refresh
self.refresh_expiration_delta = refresh_expiration_delta
self.header_prefix = header_prefix
self.jwt_add_header = jwt_add_header or {}
base_header = {'alg': self.algorithm, 'typ': 'JWT'}
for k, v in self.jwt_add_header.iteritems():
base_header[k] = v
self.cached_b64h = self.jwt_b64e(json_parser.dumps(base_header))
digestmod_mapping = {
'HS256': hashlib.sha256,
'HS384': hashlib.sha384,
'HS512': hashlib.sha512
}
self.digestmod = digestmod_mapping[algorithm]
self.user_param = user_param
self.pass_param = pass_param
self.realm = realm
self.salt = salt
self.additional_payload = additional_payload
self.before_authorization = before_authorization
self.max_header_length = max_header_length
print 'initialized'
@staticmethod
def jwt_b64e(string):
if isinstance(string, unicode):
string = string.encode('uft-8', 'strict')
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(string).strip(b'=')
@staticmethod
def jwt_b64d(string):
"""base64 decodes a single bytestring (and is tolerant to getting
called with a unicode string).
The result is also a bytestring.
"""
if isinstance(string, unicode):
string = string.encode('ascii', 'ignore')
return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(string + '=' * (-len(string) % 4))
def generate_token(self, payload):
secret = self.secret_key
if self.salt:
if callable(self.salt):
secret = "%s$%s" % (secret, self.salt(payload))
else:
secret = "%s$%s" % (secret, self.salt)
if isinstance(secret, unicode):
secret = secret.encode('ascii', 'ignore')
b64h = self.cached_b64h
b64p = self.jwt_b64e(json_parser.dumps(payload))
jbody = b64h + '.' + b64p
mauth = hmac.new(key=secret, msg=jbody, digestmod=self.digestmod)
jsign = self.jwt_b64e(mauth.digest())
return jbody + '.' + jsign
def verify_signature(self, body, signature, secret):
mauth = hmac.new(key=secret, msg=body, digestmod=self.digestmod)
return hmac.compare_digest(self.jwt_b64e(mauth.digest()), signature)
def load_token(self, token):
if isinstance(token, unicode):
token = token.encode('utf-8', 'strict')
body, sig = token.rsplit('.', 1)
b64h, b64b = body.split('.', 1)
if b64h != self.cached_b64h:
# header not the same
raise HTTP(400, u'Invalid JWT Header')
secret = self.secret_key
tokend = json_parser.loads(self.jwt_b64d(b64b))
if self.salt:
if callable(self.salt):
secret = "%s$%s" % (secret, self.salt(tokend))
else:
secret = "%s$%s" % (secret, self.salt)
if isinstance(secret, unicode):
secret = secret.encode('ascii', 'ignore')
if not self.verify_signature(body, sig, secret):
# signature verification failed
raise HTTP(400, u'Token signature is invalid')
if self.verify_expiration:
now = time.mktime(datetime.datetime.utcnow().timetuple())
if tokend['exp'] + self.leeway < now:
raise HTTP(400, u'Token is expired')
if callable(self.before_authorization):
self.before_authorization(tokend)
return tokend
def serialize_auth_session(self, session_auth):
"""
As bad as it sounds, as long as this is rarely used (vs using the token)
this is the faster method, even if we ditch session in jwt_token_manager().
We (mis)use the heavy default auth mechanism to avoid any further computation,
while sticking to a somewhat-stable Auth API.
"""
now = time.mktime(datetime.datetime.utcnow().timetuple())
expires = now + self.expiration
payload = dict(
hmac_key=session_auth['hmac_key'],
user_groups=session_auth['user_groups'],
user=session_auth['user'].as_dict(),
iat=now,
exp=expires
)
return payload
def refresh_token(self, orig_payload):
now = time.mktime(datetime.datetime.utcnow().timetuple())
if self.verify_expiration:
orig_exp = orig_payload['exp']
if orig_exp + self.leeway < now:
# token already expired, can't be used for refresh
raise HTTP(400, u'Token already expired')
orig_iat = orig_payload.get('orig_iat') or orig_payload['iat']
if orig_iat + self.refresh_expiration_delta < now:
# refreshed too long ago
raise HTTP(400, u'Token issued too long ago')
expires = now + self.refresh_expiration_delta
orig_payload.update(
orig_iat=orig_iat,
iat=now,
exp=expires,
hmac_key=web2py_uuid()
)
self.alter_payload(orig_payload)
return orig_payload
def alter_payload(self, payload):
if self.additional_payload:
if callable(self.additional_payload):
payload = self.additional_payload(payload)
elif isinstance(self.additional_payload, dict):
payload.update(self.additional_payload)
return payload
def jwt_token_manager(self):
"""
The part that issues (and refreshes) tokens.
Used in a controller, given myjwt is the istantiated class, as
def api_auth():
return myjwt.jwt_token_manager()
Then, a call to /app/c/api_auth/auth with username and password
returns a token, while /app/c/api_auth/refresh with the current token
issues another token
"""
request = current.request
# forget and unlock response
if request.args(0) == 'auth':
current.session.forget(current.response)
username = request.vars[self.user_param]
password = request.vars[self.pass_param]
valid_user = self.auth.login_bare(username, password)
if valid_user:
payload = self.serialize_auth_session(current.session.auth)
self.alter_payload(payload)
return self.generate_token(payload)
else:
raise HTTP(
401, u'Not Authorized',
**{'WWW-Authenticate': u'JWT realm="%s"' % self.realm})
elif request.args(0) == 'refresh':
if not self.allow_refresh:
raise HTTP(403, u'Refreshing token is not allowed')
token = request.vars.token
tokend = self.load_token(token)
# verification can fail here
refreshed = self.refresh_token(tokend)
return self.generate_token(refreshed)
def inject_token(self, tokend):
"""
The real deal, not touching the db but still logging-in the user
"""
self.auth.user = Storage(tokend['user'])
self.auth.user_groups = tokend['user_groups']
self.auth.hmac_key = tokend['hmac_key']
def requires_jwt(self, otherwise=None):
"""
The validator that checks for the header or the
_token var
"""
request = current.request
token_in_header = request.env.http_authorization
if token_in_header:
parts = token_in_header.split()
if parts[0].lower() != self.header_prefix.lower():
raise HTTP(400, u'Invalid JWT header')
elif len(parts) == 1:
raise HTTP(400, u'Invalid JWT header, missing token')
elif len(parts) > 2:
raise HTTP(400, 'Invalid JWT header, token contains spaces')
token = parts[1]
else:
token = request.vars._token
if token and len(token) < self.max_header_length:
tokend = self.load_token(token)
self.inject_token(tokend)
return self.auth.requires(True, otherwise=otherwise)